Where did the 1997 New Labour/'New Regions' project come from? One can identify the following strands or incentives:-

The West Lothian Question. i.e. Celtic devolution demands an English answer.

The European funding available on a regional basis.

Globalising thinking: to encourage competition for inward investment.

Interest in accountability/participation/inclusiveness.

These forces together had created an agenda for moves towards English devolution. However other factors were in play that impeded or fragmented this project:-

The Fabian/centralist ideology, opposed to any real devolution of power.

Whitehall mandarins and departments defending their turf.

Entanglement with the half completed local government reorganisation.

Euro-sceptic opposition to English regions.

Doubts about public acceptance; the winnability of regional referenda.

The result of these conflicting forces was weak and confused proposals at every stage: from the ideas put forward in the government White Paper 'Your Region, Your Choice' in April 2002 through the Regional Assemblies (Preparations) Act of 2003 to the draft Regional Powers Bill belatedly issued in July 2004.

Indications were that little account had been taken of the invited responses from regional organisations, political groups and individuals, but the Cornish issue had given rise to agonised debate right up to Cabinet level. It was confirmed by Westminster in Summer 2003 that regional referenda would be held in Autumn 2004 in the North West, North East and Yorkshire/Humberside government regions. Proposals were later withdrawn for all except the North-East. A yes vote was to be conditional on changing to unitary local government for areas presently with County and District Councils - voters would have a limited choice: which level of unitary government to opt for.

ISSUES IN THE DEBATE

In the view of most commentators the democratic deficit of the proposed regional structure ranged from 'a cause for concern' to 'so serious as to make it unlikely that referenda could be won'. For instance, elected regional assemblies with only 25 to 35 members would yield only one representative for the whole of Cornwall in the proposed South West Assembly. The proposed budgets for these assemblies (and incidentally for the unelected Regional Development Agencies) would only amount to about 5% of the regional spend by the Government Office for that same region. Similarly the executive powers of the assemblies would be very limited, their resources for spending being subject to agreement/control from central government. The language used in the proposals repeatedly referred to the 'responsibilties' of the assemblies as opposed to their 'powers'.

The questions concerning the boundaries of the new regions, their precise shapes and sizes, had been only indirectly addressed: the formal position was that regional boundaries were not for changing; a deeper reading implied the possibility of change; unofficially, there had been hints of a major rethinking of the regions to be adopted. However the general impression was given that there was not any mechanism for the evolution of unwieldy and unpopular regions into forms which take account of cultural and historical associations and/or economic realities. Taken together with the possible abolition of County Councils, the resulting lack of popular support for these administrative regions would, it was argued, make referenda for their public acceptance unwinnable. This proved to be correct.

RADICAL RESPONSES

The main campaigns in The North had accepted the official regional boundaries despite some unresolved issues (e.g. Cumbria). The original Campaign for The North (whole North) happenened to be very weak at that time, though not without advocates. The Campaign for a North East Assembly (CNA) had been at the forefront in recent years, having a radical style yet working within conventional politics. Although concerned at the limited devolution proposals their pragmatic attitude was summed up in the quote: "Let's get the door ajar first and then we can kick it open later." Among radical devolutionists responses varied between qualified support for the proposals, subject to the Unitary Counties option ... and outright opposition.

The actual referendum result was a more emphatic rejection than anyone expected. Factors in this decisive result may be summarised as follows: the failure to devolve any real powers from Westminster and its quangoes to the proposed Elected Assembly (some powers were actually to be taken away from local authorities - anti-devolution!); the precept on the unpopular Council Tax coupled with fears of escalating future costs (cf the Scottish Parliament building fiasco); the growing conviction that the proposed assembly would be both a talking shop and a gravy train for carreerists and bureaucrats; association by the 'NO' campaign (with their white elephant balloon) of regional devolution with anti-European sentiment. In the wake of this historic result the devolution debate has moved on.

THE COMMISSION ON DEVOLUTION

In the light of these events, the Continuing Commission that Devolve! was instrumental in bringing together has needed to evolve from a focus on more viable alternatives to the official 'South East' and 'South West' regions to looking at devolution issues across the whole of England.